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This article clarifies Hegel’s argument in “Force and 
the Understanding,” in his Phenomenology of Spirit, 
by developing Hegel’s underlying point through 
discussion of recent and ongoing issues concerning 
explanation in natural and psychological science. The 
latter proceeds via a critical discussion of the 
problem of other minds and the “theory theory of 
mind”. The article thereby shows how and why 
Hegel’s analysis of the understanding inaugurates a 
crucial transition in his Phenomenology, from 
consciousness to self-consciousness and life. Putting 
Hegel’s underlying points into conversation with 
recent science shows how his point—that scientific 
understanding is not abstract but embedded in human 
life—still speaks to science. 
 
Hegel’s “Force and the Understanding,” in 
his Phenomenology of Spirit, is a 
challenging chapter in an already difficult 
work, not the least because it deals with now 
arcane moments in the history of science. 
The chapter, though, is crucial in the 
Phenomenology, if not in the history of 
Western philosophy. In the Phenomenology, 
“Force and the Understanding” prepares for 
Hegel’s transition from consciousness to 
self-consciousness, desire and recognition.1 
It culminates Hegel’s novel argument, in the 
section on “Consciousness,” that the topic of 
the philosophy of knowledge could not be 
consciousness, or faculties of cognition, but 
must be the complete form of self-conscious 
life, which as subsequent chapters show, is 
lived out through historical relations betwixt 
humans. As H.S. Harris puts it in his 
masterful Hegel’s Ladder, the 
Phenomenology has a “second beginning” 
after “Force and the Understanding.”2 This 
chapter, then, is central in the history of 
Western philosophy, for it undermines the 
central tendency of modern philosophy, 
namely securing abstract reason or cognitive 
faculties as the foundation of knowledge. On 
Hegel’s argument philosophy must rather 
describe how knowledge and reason find 
their basis in the unfolding institutions of 
human life. Hegel’s revolutionary change in 
direction, and criticisms of his particular 
pursuit of this direction, resonate in 
movements as diverse as pragmatism, 
existentialism, Marxism, or Foucaultian and 
Derridian philosophies.  
This paper has a twofold aim. The first 
is to clarify Hegel’s argument in “Force and 
the Understanding,” not by giving a line by 
line exposition of Hegel’s chapter and all of 
its internal intricacies3, but by striking to 
Hegel’s underlying point through discussion 
of recent and ongoing issues in science. The 
second is to thereby show how and why 
Hegel’s analysis of the understanding 
inaugurates a change in direction, from 
consciousness to self-consciousness and life. 
Putting Hegel’s underlying points into 
conversation with recent science not only 
helps clarify Hegel, it shows how his 
point—that scientific understanding is not 
abstract but embedded in human life—still 
speaks to science.  
1) Theoretical Consciousness is Self-
Consciousness 
Hegel’s central result in “Force and the 
Understanding” is that theoretical 
consciousness is a form of self-
consciousness. A recent non-technical essay, 
“Can Science Explain Everything? 
Anything?,” by Steven Weinberg, a Nobel 
Prize winning physicist, lets us approach 
Hegel’s result via the perspective of a 
working scientist who is still plagued by the 
problem that drives “Force and the 
Understanding.”4  
Weinberg’s essay is prompted by a 
remark of a scientist friend that “Well, of 
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course you know science does not really 
explain things—it just describes them.” The 
problem here is a traditional one in 
philosophy of science, namely that scientific 
understanding teeters on the razor’s edge 
between explanation and description. In his 
essay “Hegel’s ‘Inverted World’,” Gadamer 
calls this teetering the dialectic of 
explanation, and rightly flags it as central to 
Hegel’s “Force and the Understanding.” 
Gadamer gives the example of laws of 
phonetic change: they really just give a 
descriptive formula of a linguistic 
phenomenon; as descriptive, the laws are 
identical with the phenomena; so it is hard to 
see how they count as something different 
from the phenomena, something that could 
explain them.5 Or as Ernst Rutherford 
famously declaimed (cited in Weinberg), “In 
science there is only physics; everything else 
is stamp collecting.” Disciplines like biology 
just collect data, so biological “laws” do not 
really explain the phenomena, they are just 
descriptions of the phenomena put in general 
form.  
Presumably Weinberg’s friend thinks 
that all science, even physics, is “stamp 
collecting,” and to counter this Weinberg 
needs to show how science produces 
something other than descriptions, 
something that would count as explaining 
the phenomena—and explaining them 
objectively. Weinberg turns to the example 
of thermodynamics, the science of heat. He 
argues that “Thermodynamics itself is never 
the explanation of anything—you always 
have to ask why thermodynamics applies to 
whatever system you are studying, and you 
do this by deducing the laws of 
thermodynamics from whatever more 
fundamental principles happen to be 
relevant to that system.” If you just work out 
the laws that describe how heat is manifest 
in a gas, you are stuck with description. If 
you want to explain heat, you need to 
deduce those descriptive laws from the 
statistical mechanics that describe the 
movement of gas molecules. Weinberg 
rescues physics from philately by imposing 
what I call a deduction criterion.  
But Hegel’s analysis in “Force and the 
Understanding” shows that the deduction 
criterion does not escape the dialectic of 
explanation. This is because of the way that 
consciousness accesses the phenomena. The 
problem is this: According to Weinberg’s 
deduction criterion, explanation requires 
both a law that describes the appearance of 
the phenomenon, and a way of deducing that 
lawful appearance from what I call a more 
fundamental substratum. But the empirical 
source of our claims about both these things, 
the lawful appearance and its substratum, is 
one and the same phenomenon. The 
sensuous phenomenon is the appearance of 
both the explanandum (that which is to be 
explained) and the explanans (that which is 
doing the explaining). We look at the 
phenomena of heat. This prompts us to 
describe the laws of its dissipation over 
time. By digging further into the same 
phenomena, we find that we can understand 
that law statistically in terms of the 
aggregate behaviour of moving molecules. 
For our understanding, one and the same 
sensuous phenomenon is evidence of both a 
lawful appearance and its fundamental, 
explanatory substratum. A question 
immediately arises: why is it that heat 
understood statistically in terms of the 
aggregate behaviour of moving molecules 
counts as more fundamental than and 
explanatory of heat described in terms of 
laws of its sensuous appearance? Let us 
consider a dialectical tension at work in this 
question. 
If the substratum were simply identical 
with sensuous appearances (if the explanans 
is identical with the explanandum), then the 
so-called explanation would really just be a 
description of appearances, and Weinberg’s 
friend is right. So we must be able to claim 
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that the fundamental substratum is 
something different than lawful 
appearances.  
But if the fundamental substratum is 
different from what sensuously appears, it 
must be supersensible relative to the 
appearances that it explains, it must be a 
theoretical object. Yet it is one and the same 
sensuous phenomenon that gives evidence 
both of its law of appearance and of its 
supersensible substratum. More, the 
supersensible substratum is supposed to 
explain what appears. On both counts the 
supersensible substratum must be inherently 
linked to what appears. What appears is 
nothing other than the appearance of the 
supersensible substratum. The phenomenon 
of heat is nothing other than the 
phenomenon of statistical mechanics of 
molecules. But then the substratum is not 
different than lawful appearances, and the 
substratum is not entirely supersensible, 
since it appears as the phenomenon that it 
explains.  
With one hand we draw a distinction 
within what appears, claiming there is 
something supersensible behind the scenes 
that makes what appears be the way it is. 
With the other hand we erase that 
distinction, by claiming that what appears is 
nothing other than the appearance of a 
substratum behind the scenes. This tension 
is at the heart of Hegel’s dialectic of 
explanation, and it means that it is our 
consciousness that posits a difference, 
within appearances, between the explanans 
and the explanandum. To cite Hegel: 
…the difference, then, is posited by the 
Understanding in such a way that, at the 
same time, it is expressly stated that the 
difference is not a difference belonging to 
the thing itself. This necessity [of positing 
the difference], which is merely verbal, is 
thus a recital of the moments constituting 
the cycle of the necessity. The moments 
are indeed distinguished, but at the same 
time, their difference is expressly said to 
be not a difference of the thing itself, and 
consequently is itself immediately 
cancelled again. This process is called 
‘explanation.’ (M154, W/C 109) 
The difference between the explanans and 
the explanandum, for example, between heat 
and molecular motion, is not a difference 
belonging to objects themselves, it reflects 
our way of describing things in our effort at 
explaining them. This is plainly right: in my 
hot cup of tea there are not two different 
things, heat dissipating in this and that way, 
and molecular motions, they are identical. 
Yet I differentiate the two in trying to 
explain heat. 
Weinberg gives two examples that 
support the Hegelian point that it is our 
consciousness that draws the distinction 
between explanans and explanandum. (1) 
Sometimes it is not clear what explains 
what. Weinberg points out that if you are 
Newton deducing the law of gravitation 
from the fact of Kepler’s laws of planetary 
motion, then Kepler’s laws explain 
Newton’s laws of gravitation. But nowadays 
it would “feel absurd” to say that Kepler’s 
law explains Newton’s, since we take 
Newton’s laws to be more general, and 
students today learn to deduce Kepler’s laws 
from Newton’s, not the other way round. 
Yet as Weinberg remarks, the criteria of 
generality are ambiguous. What counts as 
general is not specified by things themselves 
but by what we are trying to explain. And 
here there is another peculiarity. (2) “We 
often say that something is explained by 
something else without our actually being 
able to deduce it,” for example, we claim 
that the “value of […] proton mass is 
entailed by quantum chromodynamics, even 
though we don’t know how to do the 
calculation.” The peculiarity is that the 
understanding is oriented by an unknown, 
purely theoretical, supersensible object that 
is nonetheless fundamental. How could a 
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theoretical term be manifest as fundamental 
if we do not know how it works in 
explaining the phenomena? How could such 
a fundamental substratum have objective 
status if it is posited as theoretical, as 
reflective of the demands of our 
explanation? 
It looks, then, like explanation goes in 
circles, explaining the explanandum by way 
of the explanandum redescribed; or that in 
explanations, the vector between explanans 
and explanandum sometimes reverses 
according to our interests; or that 
explanations sometimes appeal to an 
explanans that we do not fully understand. 
On Hegel’s analysis, the underlying problem 
is this: In the course of explanation, the 
understanding seeks, via its consciousness of 
the world, to discover a unifying, 
fundamental, objective substratum that 
explains the world, but the very structure of 
explanation is such that what it actually 
grasps is something that reflects 
consciousness. Such a something does not 
seem to satisfy the initial aim of 
understanding and explaining, it does not 
seem to provide an objective stabilizing 
ground or criterion for explanation. From 
the scientific perspective, at least as it is 
usually portrayed, this is particularly 
horrifying. It is important to note that all this 
is a consequence of a commitment to the 
empirical: we access empirical facts only 
through a consciousness embedded in the 
world, and we cannot escape this; if our 
theoretical claims are driven by the facts, 
then they too arise in light of our 
consciousness of the world; the difference 
between facts and theoretical objects is thus 
drawn within our consciousness of the 
world; and so it is a difference that reflects 
consciousness, it is not something purely 
objective.  
But in Hegel’s analysis, this 
problem—that the criterion of explanation 
reflects consciousness—turns out to be the 
solution to the dialectic of explanation. That 
is, the solution is simply to acknowledge 
that the initial demands of understanding 
and explaining are wrong-headed, that a 
satisfying explanation could never come to 
rest in an object purely alien to 
consciousness. The understanding is 
satisfied by an object that appears as already 
reflecting consciousness’s way of 
articulating it. The satisfaction of the 
understanding is a form of self-
consciousness, something more than mere 
consciousness of the world. 
Given the centrality of this result to 
Hegel’s “Force and the Understanding,” it is 
worth deepening it through a summary in 
terms of Hegel that also sheds light on his 
argument. First, “Force and the 
Understanding” is a chapter in Hegel’s 
section on “Consciousness,” where Hegel 
analyzes philosophies that claim that 
faculties of consciousness are the source of 
comprehensive knowledge of the world. In 
his first two chapters he quickly demolishes 
the claim that a faculty of immediate 
sensory reception could give comprehensive 
knowledge, for at the very least our sensory 
faculty requires already given universal 
structures (such as space and time), and 
what is given in these structures must 
undergo perceptual synthesis that articulates 
and categorizes the given.6 The faculty of 
perception, then, is well suited to ‘postage-
stamp collecting,’ to cataloguing and 
describing regularities in the phenomena. 
But what is required for knowledge is 
something further, namely understanding, 
which grasps the underlying unity of the 
observed phenomena. For example, 
perceptual observation can tell you that salt, 
which has the properties of forming white, 
cubical crystals, and tasting tart on the 
tongue, also has the property of promoting 
rust. But until you understand how all these 
properties are necessarily interrelated, you 
do not have comprehensive knowledge of 
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salt. Perception cannot let you know that it 
is salt qua salt (whatever it is that makes salt 
be salty, white, cubical and tart) that 
promotes rust; perception cannot rule out, 
for example, that it this particular sample of 
salt qua contaminated, or qua having 
peculiarities found only in salt from this 
mine (say, peculiar allotropes), or qua being 
heated by the sun, that promotes rust. 
(Perception cannot sort out accidents from 
essences.) What is needed for 
comprehensive knowledge of salt as rust 
promoting is, for example, understanding 
that the very same chemical structure that 
forms cubical crystals in salt necessarily and 
inherently also makes it look white, taste tart 
and promote rust.  
In Hegel’s analysis, this sort of 
knowledge requires cognition of objects in 
terms of underlying forces and laws that go 
beyond what is immediately perceived. But 
this plunges us into a dialectic of unity and 
diversity. In comprehending the diversity of 
sensuous appearances as the expression of 
underlying, unified forces, we need to 
invoke a multiplicity of different, 
interrelated forces. And in order to unify this 
diversity of forces we appeal to the concept 
of an underlying law. But law expands into a 
multiplicity of different laws that are 
nonetheless conceived in terms of one 
unified law of everything.7 In terms of our 
framework, the important point is that this 
expansion of the dialectic of unity and 
diversity pushes consciousness into thinking 
of supersensible, that is, theoretical, objects, 
because unity and diversity have the sort of 
“immediately cancelled” difference 
discussed above, a difference posited by the 
understanding that could not be located in 
sensuous objects.8  
The dialectic of unity and diversity, 
then, leads into a dialectic of the sensible 
and the supersensible, which Hegel takes up 
in his superbly difficult discussion of the 
“inverted world.” In effect, this new 
dialectic aims to give “immediately 
cancelled” differences some sort of 
objective form; instead of admitting that it is 
consciousness that is drawing distinctions 
between the explanans and explanandum, 
the understanding tries to project this 
difference into the world, in terms of a 
difference between a supersensible 
explanans and a sensible explanandum. 
Hegel’s point, though, is that the dialectical 
tensions underlying this explanatory strategy 
drive the understanding from: (1) explaining 
things via supersensible, theoretical objects 
that are reflective merely of perceptual 
appearances, in what Hegel calls the first 
“supersensible world”; to (2) explaining 
things via a “second supersensible world” or 
“inverted world” in which perceptual 
appearances are already ‘theory laden’ such 
that appearance itself already reflects 
consciousness.9  
To illustrate, using an example from 
science: In 1733, in one of the important 
episodes in the history of electrical science, 
the French chemist Charles Dufay, 
observing that rubbed glass and resin 
behaved in quite different ways, 
hypothesized that there are two kinds of 
electricity, which he called vitreous and 
resinous. Dufay’s hypothesis illustrates the 
explanatory strategy at work in the first 
supersensible world: Dufay’s two kinds of 
electricity are supersensible10, theoretical 
objects that shadow and explain—reflect—
two sorts of sensible electrical phenomena; 
and the supersensible objects, vitreous and 
resinous electrical fluids, are distinguished 
by way of characteristics of the perceived 
objects they are to explain, namely, they are 
distinguished as appearing in glass versus 
resin. In a sense, this strategy is not much of 
an advance over the sorts of claims that 
perception can make, and as explanatory it is 
not much better than Moliere’s doctor 
claiming that opium puts people to sleep 
because it has a dormitive principle. But the 
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claim does advance science because it 
discerns two different sorts of electrical 
phenomena, as differences that are to be 
understood, not merely perceived. 
The history of science shows that 
giving a satisfactory explanation of these 
phenomena drives the understanding to the 
second supersensible world, in which the 
phenomena themselves are redescribed. 
Satisfactory scientific understanding is 
achieved when the two kinds of electricity 
are no longer distinguished by the fact that 
they appear in glass versus resin, but by 
being positive and negative electrical 
charges. This redescription is the first step in 
grasping the underlying unity of charges. 
The key point is that the distinction between 
positive and negative is not drawn in or by 
immediate sensible appearance itself. What 
is directly given to perception are different 
behaviours of glass and resin, not something 
marked with the conceptual distinction 
between positive and negative signs, yet you 
understand that the perceived behaviours of 
glass and resin are explained by appeal to a 
conceptual distinction. And you thereby 
understand that what is at work in sensible 
appearance is positive and negative charges. 
You are no longer, then, looking at things 
qua differentiated from one another by 
merely perceived, immediately given 
determinations (e.g., the difference between 
brittle, cold, clear glass, and sticky-friable, 
warm, cloudy resin); you are looking at 
them qua differentiated by characteristics 
grasped by the understanding (the difference 
between positive and negative). Again, 
when you tingle your tongue by touching it 
to the top of a nine-volt battery, sensory 
experience does not give you something 
labelled as a relation between “positive” and 
“negative”; but to explain your experience, 
you must first redescribe it as a matter of 
tonguing positive and negative poles that are 
themselves interrelated (because, it turns 
out, the negative pole has a surplus of 
electrons relative to the positive pole, and 
the surplus flows through your saliva, 
tingling your tongue, etc.). 
The status of the sensible objects of 
explanation has thereby changed: they are 
no longer things entirely alien to your 
thinking, differentiated by sensible 
characteristics that happen to pile up in the 
postage-stamp album of the world; they 
themselves manifest a distinction between 
positive and negative charge, a distinction 
that reflects the understanding, a distinction 
that is not alien to you.  
There are several reasons why Hegel 
speaks of objects of this sort as constituting 
(for consciousness) the “inverted world.” 
The first, which is well explained by John 
Russon, is this.11 In the world-view of the 
first supersensible world, the supersensible, 
theoretical object, is “the real thing” that 
stands behind the perceived world: we read 
from the sensible to an invisible 
supersensible behind it (from rubbed glass to 
vitreous electrical fluid). This is the 
“classic” vector from the sensible to the 
supersensible that we might find in 
traditional interpretations of Plato, for 
example. The world-view of the second 
supersensible world this vector is inverted: 
we read from the supersensible (from 
concepts like positive and negative) to the 
sensible world as reflecting the 
supersensible; and we read supersensible, 
theoretical articulations right in the 
perceived world, as unified with it, not 
standing behind it unseen (this button of 
metal itself is the negative pole of the 
battery).12 And so the second supersensible 
world also inverts the usual world-view that 
things in the perceived world are in 
themselves bereft of intelligibility. Here we 
might think of Holmes and Watson: for 
Holmes, the intelligibility of things is visible 
right in them; seeing the red mud on a 
client’s shoes is much like reading a book 
that says “the client has been in this part of 
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London today.” This startles Watson’s and 
up-ends his world-view, because for Watson 
the pages of this book are buried; all he sees 
is mud.  
Further, given this sort of reading, in 
the inverted world, supersensible terms can 
invert their values. In contemporary 
electronics, the negative pole of a battery is 
understood as having a surplus of electrons 
relative to the positive pole, and when a 
circuit is closed, the surplus electrons flow 
from the negative to the positive pole. But 
the assignment of values and distinctions 
such as positive/negative and surplus/deficit, 
can be inverted according to how we need to 
read the phenomena. For example, when 
explaining semiconductors such as PNP 
transistors, it is helpful to think of the N 
(negative) region as having a deficit of holes 
rather than a surplus of electrons (holes 
themselves are deficits of electrons, of 
negative charges, creating by doping the 
crystalline structure of the semiconductor 
lattice so as to displace electrons); and to 
think of holes (absences) moving around 
when current is applied to the N region. 
There is nothing to prevent us from 
analyzing current in batteries as a flow of a 
surplus of electron deficits from the positive 
to the negative pole. When we read our 
understanding in the visible phenomena, 
what is visible to the understanding is 
inherently invertible. 
Put another way, when we explain 
from the world-view of the first 
supersensible world, we ask “What are the 
theoretical objects that explain the perceived 
facts?” We answer the question by seeking a 
supersensible, theoretical explanans that, it 
turns out, is in fact merely the explanandum 
redescribed (e.g., a vitreous electrical fluid 
that explains observed charges in glass). 
This explanatory strategy repeats the 
dialectic of explanation in a new register. In 
contrast, when we explain from the 
world-view of the second supersensible 
world, the inverted world, we ask “How do 
the phenomena themselves have to be if they 
are explicable and intelligible to us?” In 
posing the question this way we admit that 
first of all we have to redescribe the 
explanandum as already reflecting the 
understanding, rather than having the 
sensible drive us to seek a supersensible 
behind it. To explain the two kinds of 
electricity we have to step back from what 
perception directly tells us (that glass and 
resin respond differently to being rubbed) 
and first of all have the insight that we 
should redescribe the explanandum as 
constituted by negative and positive charges, 
as phenomena already inherently reflective 
of theoretical distinctions, such as the 
distinction between positive and negative.  
As Hegel puts it, “The 
Understanding’s ‘explanation’ is primarily 
only the description of what self-
consciousness is” (M163, W/C 116), for 
what we observe in the phenomena are 
distinctions that reflect our own 
consciousness and criteria. Our 
consciousness, then, is not simply receptive 
of objects, nor is it simply synthesizing and 
unifying what is given to it; we comprehend 
objects that first appear independent of 
consciousness, as in fact reflective of 
consciousness. This sort of consciousness is 
what Hegel calls self-consciousness. 
Kepler’s laws can explain Newton’s laws or 
the other way around, there is really nothing 
in the object that resists this reversal; what 
resists this reversal, what makes the 
explanation go one way and not the other 
way, is our way of being conscious of these 
relations; and so when we are conscious of 
Newton’s laws as explaining Kepler’s we 
are in fact also self-conscious of the interests 
and criteria we are bringing to bear in our 
explanations.  
The initial problem broached was that 
the dialectic of explanation erodes resistance 
points, objective grounds, for drawing a 
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distinction and stabilizing the relation 
between the explanans and the 
explanandum. We have now found a 
resistance point, but in being conscious of it 
we are implicitly describing our way of 
being self-conscious, we are implicitly 
conscious of our own criteria shaping our 
consciousness of the world. Consciousness, 
as Hegel puts it, overarches (übergreift, 
M166, W/C 120) its object, comprehends 
things that appear independent of 
consciousness as in fact reflecting and 
satisfying its own interests, and as therefore 
dependent on consciousness. What satisfies 
explanation, makes an explanation count as 
an explanation, is not anything purely 
objective or alien to us, but an object that 
appears as already reflecting 
consciousness’s way of articulating it, so, as 
said above, the satisfaction of the 
understanding is a form of self-
consciousness. Consciousness identifies 
itself with and through its object, and it is in 
this identification that it finds the 
satisfaction of explanation. 
2) The Life of  Theoretical 
Consciousness via “The Scientist in the 
Crib” 
In the chapter following “Force and the 
Understanding,” Hegel discusses self-
consciousness in terms of life and desire. 
The transition to life and desire is one of the 
most difficult yet crucial transitions in the 
Phenomenology. So we now need to see 
why consciousness’s overarching 
identification with its object is to be 
conceived in terms of life. I approach this 
point through discussion of a form of 
scientific consciousness that is often 
overlooked…because it is not usually taken 
to be scientific consciousness at all, namely 
the infant’s consciousness. H.S. Harris  
gives a precedent for this shift in showing 
how Hegel’s turn from consciousness to 
self-consciousness can be interpreted in 
terms of family life, and also suggests it in 
his discussion of understanding as 
learning.13 But the proximate stimulus for 
my shift is a recent book, The Scientist in the 
Crib, in which three prominent child 
psychologists, Alison Gopnik, Andrew 
Meltzoff and Patricia Kuhl give a (non-
technical) summary of their research. They 
argue that children are not simply passive 
vessels to be filled with knowledge, they are 
active in learning about the world. Indeed, 
children, even very young infants, act in the 
manner of scientific investigators of the 
world who learn by making and testing 
theories.14  
Specifically, what I want to look at is 
the child’s consciousness of others. For the 
authors of the Scientist in the Crib, 
especially Gopnik, the child’s experience of 
other minds gives strong proof that children 
are theoreticians. This claim is in part 
motivated by the classical problem of other 
minds. As the authors of the Scientist in the 
Crib put it, in a pungent, non-technical 
formulation of the classical problem:  
All that really reaches us from the outside 
world is a play of colours and shapes, 
light and sound. Take the people around 
the table. We seem to see husbands and 
wives and friends and little brothers. But 
what we really see are bags of skin 
stuffed into pieces of cloth and draped 
over chairs. There are small restless black 
spots that move at the top of the bags of 
skin, and a hole underneath that 
irregularly makes noises. The bags move 
in unpredictable ways, and sometimes 
one of them will touch us. The holes 
change shape, and occasionally salty 
liquid pours from the two spots.  
This is, of course, a madman’s view of 
other people, a nightmare. The problem 
of Other Minds is how we somehow get 
from this mad view to our ordinary 
experience of people. (4-5)  
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According to this formulation of the 
problem of other minds, perceptual 
consciousness could not give us an 
encounter with other minds, for perception 
only gives us bags of skin, and other minds 
are something more than bags of skin. To 
encounter other minds we need something 
more than perception.  
Gopnik argues that the something 
more is a theory. The infant is a theoretician 
who comprehends her world, and other 
minds appear in that world as the 
explanation of phenomena. Like quasars, 
other minds, according to Gopnik, are not 
direct observables, but theoretical postulates 
necessary to explain observables. As Gopnik 
puts it in her technical work:  
The developmental evidence suggests 
that children construct a coherent, 
abstract account of the mind which 
enables them to explain and predict 
psychological phenomena. Although this 
theory is implicit rather than explicit, this 
kind of cognitive structure appears to 
share many features with a scientific 
theory. Children’s theories of the mind 
postulate unobserved entities (beliefs and 
desires) and laws connecting them, such 
as the practical syllogism. Their theories 
allow prediction, and they change 
(eventually) as a result of falsifying 
evidence. 15
Gopnik conducted experiments in which 
children answered questions about what 
other people are thinking, perceiving or 
intending. She argues that the claims 
children make about other minds, and the 
errors they make, have the sort of 
systematic, predictive and revisable 
character that belongs to scientific theories. 
The child is not directly responding to the 
perceptual data, but is interpreting the data 
in light of a hypothesis; fundamental shifts 
in the child’s claims are not due to changes 
in the perceptual data, but to shifts in the 
theory. In sum, the child’s experience of 
other minds is neither immediate nor 
perceptual, it is mediated by an at least 
implicit theoretical comprehension (the 
language of mediation and immediacy is 
Gopnik’s). This position is known as the 
“theory theory of other minds”: a theory of 
other minds in which possession of a theory 
of mind is fundamental to overcoming the 
gap between one’s own mind and an other’s 
mind. 
Put in Hegel’s terms, according to 
Gopnik, the child’s consciousness of other 
minds is a form of theoretical (rather than 
perceptual) consciousness. What I wish to 
show is that in fact this is a form of self-
consciousness stabilized by living interests, 
by the infant’s desire. I do this by showing 
how the infant theoretician’s knowledge of 
other minds is untenable if configured as in  
“the first supersensible world” discussed 
above, and can only stabilize in an “inverted 
world,” a world-view in which the 
phenomena already reflect the infant’s 
interests and consciousness.  
To begin, let us note that in Gopnik’s 
“theory theory” perceptual data prompts the 
child’s application and revision of a theory 
of mind. In order to comprehend the 
perceived behaviour of complex “bags of 
skin,” the child hypothesizes something that 
is not perceived, but theoretical, namely the 
mind of another person. As in Hegel’s 
analysis, the data of perception pose a 
problem that demands further 
comprehension: the very diversity of the 
perceptual phenomena compels the child to 
attend to a comprehensible, supersensible, 
theoretical unity, not a direct observable.16 
On this assumption, the child’s experience 
of failing to comprehend the perceptual data 
is what prompts a revision of its hypothesis. 
This defines the dynamic of the 
understanding that we are studying.  
Consider the child at the dinner table, 
trying to comprehend perceptual phenomena 
such as smiles and frowns, that is, regular 
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patterns in “bags of skin.” We can imagine 
the child acting on the hypothesis that the 
smile-phenomenon is explained because it 
manifests something supersensible, called 
approval. We do not need to claim that the 
child explicitly and self-consciously thinks 
about this hypothesis, for the child who 
merely acts on this hypothesis will 
experience the diversity of smile-phenomena 
as in each case explained by and manifesting 
a comprehensible unity called approval. 
That is, we can consider theoretical 
consciousness in terms of the acts and 
experience it generates, although below, to 
simplify the exposition, I speak of the child 
as explicitly thinking about theoretical 
terms. For the child, what I am here calling 
approval is a phenomenon having the 
structure of what Hegel calls a force: it is the 
manifest expression of a supersensible 
comprehensible unity. Approval is manifest 
in the smile in the way that vitreous 
electrical fluid is, for Dufay, manifest in 
charged glass, and the child is pursuing the 
explanatory strategy of the first 
supersensible world.  
But people do not just smile, they do 
other things with their faces. And to 
comprehend approval is to comprehend 
contrasting expressions. Not only does the 
child have to comprehend all instances of 
smile-phenomena in terms of approval, she 
has to comprehend approval as manifest 
only in smile-phenomena, not other facial 
gestures, such as frown-phenomena. Further, 
smile-phenomena and frown-phenomena are 
interrelated: smiles and frowns spread from 
face to face, or lead to their opposites. The 
child cannot stop with comprehension of 
smiles-as-approval, she has to comprehend 
an interrelation between different instances 
of approval, and between approval and 
disapproval. The child must comprehend a 
unified network of expressive phenomena. 
This is Hegel’s point that forces are 
necessarily manifest as a unified sphere of 
interrelated forces. (M150-151, W/C 105-
106) 
But sometimes we express the opposite 
of what we really feel: for example, we 
smile even if we disapprove. This would not 
be apparent to a child who comprehends 
smiles as isolate expressions, but it will be 
apparent to one who comprehends 
expressions as a unified network. Against 
that comprehensive background, a reversal 
of expression is confusing. Either the child’s 
way of comprehending the interrelation of 
approval and disapproval is wrong, and the 
child cannot explain the phenomena, or it is 
not possible for the child to directly read 
back from the sensible phenomena (such as 
smiles and frowns) to a comprehensible, 
supersensible unity (such as approval and 
disapproval). In either case, if the child 
persists in the strategy of reading back from 
the phenomena to a supersensible explanans, 
then making sense of the confusion requires 
the introduction of another, hidden variable.  
The child could act on the hypothesis, 
for example, that some “bags of skin” have a 
sweet, positive character and others have a 
sour, negative character. (I introduce the 
terms “sour” and “sweet” here to help 
illuminate Hegel’s usage of these terms in 
paragraphs such as M158, W/C 111-112.) 
Thus a sweet character may smile even 
though disapproving of something, etc. 
Character, by virtue of its role in the child’s 
explanatory strategy, is supersensible. If it 
were sensible, it would be part of the 
problem, another possibly confusing 
expression, rather than a supersensible factor 
that helps clear up confusion. But, for 
similar reasons, if character is a 
supersensible thing that sorts out confusions 
about other supersensible terms such as 
approval or disapproval, then character 
cannot be directly read back from 
someone’s expression. Because of its 
explanatory role, character is 
underdetermined by the phenomena. In 
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other words, the child who is trying to sort 
things out by introducing the contrast 
between sour/sweet or negative/positive 
character can no longer pursue the strategy 
of the first supersensible world, because the 
register of sensible expressions can no 
longer determine variables in the 
supersensible world. 
This leads to an obvious problem. 
What determines the character-value of a 
given “bag of skin”? Is Georg’s behaviour to 
be explained by thinking that he is a frowny 
person who is really sweet underneath, or a 
frowny person who is playing at being sweet 
underneath whilst really being sour? How 
can you tell the difference between a 
sweet/positive and a sour/negative character, 
given that a sweet/positive character can 
become sour/negative, or someone who is 
fundamentally sweet/positive can at times 
behave in a sour/negative manner? In facing 
people like Georg, mightn’t you experience 
them as having a shifting appearance, first 
appearing sweet/positive, then 
sour/negative, and so on? 
It is easy to grasp what it would be like 
to be conscious of the world in this way, 
especially as a child. Do they really approve 
of me? How am I to make sense of the 
conflicts between what they appear to 
approve and what they really approve? What 
is their character, really? They keep 
changing their minds; I do one thing one day 
and they’re happy about it, I do the same 
thing the next day and they’re angry. How 
can I tell what they’re really like? We have 
all been in something like these familial 
shoes, I’d wager, perhaps that is why they 
bronzed them: congratulations, you figured 
it out. But how did we figure it out?  
The child here is in something like the 
position of the scientist who realizes that a 
positive-negative type contrast needs to be 
deployed in explaining the phenomena, but 
also realizes that the valuation/assignment of 
positive and negative sides might vary with 
the phenomena, for example, might differ in 
thinking about batteries versus transistors. 
There is a difference of course, for in our 
example, it is, as it were, hard to tell if 
Georg is a “battery” or a “transistor” and the 
problem is that he can switch between the 
two. Moreover, scientists belong to 
communities which cut through such 
problems by invoking a rational criterion 
enjoined by consciousness itself, for 
example, Ockham’s razor, a principled, 
rational demand for economy in explanation, 
a demand that does not stem from the object, 
but from the interrelation of subject and 
object as developed by a community that has 
procedures for agreeing upon standards. But 
the child does not have such a principle, or 
at least is not ready to grasp it or justify it as 
a member of a rational community. More, 
the child is not quite a member of such a 
community, for what we are looking at now 
concerns how the child learns to become a 
member of any community at all in the first 
place.  
What the case of the child lets us see is 
that what stabilizes the child’s theorizing is 
not a principled, rational demand, but rather 
a more basic demand: the simple need to 
have some sort of stable comprehension of 
“bags of skin.” Imagine a child vacillating 
between different attitudes toward Georg’s 
character. The child’s storm of indecision is 
experienced by the child as in fact storming 
across Georg’s face: Georg sits there, across 
the table, face unchanging, at first looking to 
the child sweet/positive, then sour/negative, 
and so on, as the child’s view of Georg 
changes. The problem is that this storm 
offers no certainty, security or 
comprehension, quite the opposite. What 
calms the storm is the child’s consciousness 
that she is responsible for it. She realizes it 
is not simply Georg’s expression that is 
changing Georg, but her view of Georg. The 
other part in calming the storm is that Georg 
himself has a character and takes 
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responsibility for it: if Georg’s expressions 
were entirely arbitrary and irrational, if he 
did not work to have them express 
something like a steady character that can be 
mapped in terms of contrasts such as 
sweet/sour or positive/negative, there would 
be no way for the child to comprehend 
Georg. Gopnik, Meltzoff and Kuhl admit 
that the view of other people as “bags of 
skin” is a madman’s view of the world, but 
if people around the child did not take 
responsibility for their expression—trying to 
teach expressions as expressing character so 
that the child may learn about expressions 
and character—then the child would be 
living in a mad world and would go mad. 
We can say, then, that the child 
reaches an understanding of Georg’s 
character only because she is engaged in an 
interested17, interpretative act that 
overarches (übergreift, M166, W/C 122) 
Georg. She is not simply engaged in a 
reading that is propelled backward from the 
phenomena to the hypothesis of a 
supersensible character behind the scenes, 
she is engaged in an activity of making 
sense of the phenomena by reading character 
in the phenomena, and she can do this 
because the phenomena already conform to 
this kind of reading. The child, like Holmes, 
is living in an “inverted world” in which 
perceived objects, as it were, wear their 
intelligible character on their sleeves; but 
whereas Watson has the option of living so 
as to not be able to read the intelligibility 
that Holmes finds in things, the child who 
cannot read other bodies as intelligible 
others is living in a possibly mad world.  
All of this, however, conceptually 
entails that the problem of other minds, as 
treated by the “theory theory,” is badly put. 
There never is a stage in which all the child 
encounters is “bags of skin”; and her 
encounter with something more than that is 
not mediated by the simple addition of a 
theory to the facts. If the child is ever to 
make sense of them, the “bags of skin” 
themselves already have to appear as 
mindful bodies who are mindful of the child. 
The child’s ability to learn about others 
depends on the child’s desire to learn, a 
desire geared to the adult’s desire to teach. 
Or, equally, what leads to understanding is 
not a purely theoretical process divorced 
from its object, but a pre-theoretical need to 
understand that is satisfied only by taking 
responsibility for the way the object is 
comprehended, which is possible only if the 
object itself is responsible to 
comprehension, if it works in such a way 
that probing it, questioning it, working with 
it, provokes responses that fit with our 
ability to comprehend. In this respect the 
analysis resonates with classic 
phenomenological criticisms of the problem 
of other minds.18
In other words, the need to explain is 
stabilized and satisfied by something pre-
theoretical. Gopnik, in other research, is 
aware of this. In fact, Gopnik suggests that 
explanation is driven by something that 
might be called desire, even going so far as 
to talk about “explanation as orgasm,” in the 
sense that the satisfaction found in 
explaining things is akin to the satisfaction 
of an orgasm.19 Gopnik’s point is that 
without some kind of drive for satisfaction, 
theorizing would be rudderless. Gopnik, 
however, in effect eliminates what Hegel 
calls self-consciousness from the drive to 
explain and from the child’s pre-theoretical 
relation to others, by conceiving both in 
terms of evolved capacities, that is, in terms 
of faculties of consciousness, a kind of 
possession of the subject. For Hegel, 
instead, self-consciousness is to be 
understood as a dynamic and open ended 
relationship that is not a possession, but a 
dialectic, a process. In fact, Hegel’s analysis 
of understanding would imply that no 
possession of the subject could stabilize the 
theoretical circles that have repeatedly 
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arisen in our discussions above, for no 
internal criterion posited by the 
understanding is univalent or stable; in terms 
of concocting theoretical structures, 
paranoid and baroque systems of 
explanation are always possible, and what 
cuts through these and gives us a 
comprehensive relation to an intelligible 
world is relational, a relation to a world that 
is intelligible and reflective of our pre-
theoretical needs and desires.20 The 
understanding only finds theoretical ballast 
in its pre-theoretical relation to something 
beyond it. Coming back to recent science we 
could say that we, after all, evolved in this 
world and universe, and our evolved 
ecological relation to our world and our 
developmental milieu is part and parcel of 
our theoretical ability. Put in stronger form: 
we could not know, in any robust sense, a 
universe in which we did not grow up or 
evolve. Put in more everyday form, to gain 
knowledge in new situations, we grow into 
them. Even more bluntly: knowledge 
doesn’t just run on theorizing, but on 
growing up and learning, becoming 
responsible to things in multiple dimensions. 
What makes theoretical consciousness 
possible, then, is a form of life, a pre-
theoretical institution, that gives something 
like an Ockham’s razor bred in bone, a razor 
necessary because a child, before becoming 
a member of an explicitly self-conscious, 
rational scientific community, needs to 
relate to others as others. A child who did 
not act with the implicit pre-theoretical 
conviction that the dinner table situation 
must make sense, and that therefore 
distinctions that make sense to the child 
(such as sweet/sour or positive/negative 
character) must apply to the world, would go 
mad. And children can be driven mad if they 
grow up with dinner table situations that 
refuse to allow such distinctions to apply.  
3) Conclusion 
Understanding, Hegel shows, is not a merely 
theoretical act, nor is it an act of 
consciousness over against an utterly alien 
object. Understanding is an act in which we 
identify with our object, and are conscious 
of what is at stake in our own 
consciousness—identify ourselves—through 
our identification with our object. It is also 
at the same time necessarily an act in which 
we differentiate ourselves from our object, 
for it is only by being conscious of 
something different than ourselves that we 
settle our understanding and identity. Put in 
terms of the “resistance point,” the 
resistance point that stabilizes explanation 
could neither be in consciousness on its 
own, for consciousness cannot resist itself; 
nor could it be in the object on its own, for 
independent of a criterion of consciousness 
the phenomena manifest by the object can 
be explained in many ways. Rather, 
consciousness resists itself with and through 
its object, which is to say it is self-
consciousness.  
The analysis of Gopnik’s “theory 
theory” of other minds lets us see how this 
relation to the object is structured by 
something pre-theoretical, by a form of life 
that has its own imperatives and desires. The 
infant in the crib is a kind of scientist, but 
her scientific grasp of the human world is 
first of all stabilized by needs, imperatives 
and desires, especially the first need of a 
scientist, namely the need for others. This is 
the first need for it is only as a member of a 
scientific community that can confirm, 
disconfirm, analyze, criticize and test results 
and claims, that a finite theoretician can ever 
actually become a scientist who can claim 
knowledge. The rest of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, amongst other things, 
proves this last point, and also shows how 
the imperatives and desires that drive our 
need for others would, in the dialectic of 
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mutual recognition, need to be satisfied 
through the institution of a rational scientific 
community and the moral and spiritual 
community that makes such community 
possible. The important point here, though, 
is the exposition and articulation of Hegel’s 
point that theoretical consciousness is a form 
of self-consciousness structured by a pre-
theoretical living relation to the world. All 
scientists are first of all children, scientists 
in the lab or mind are first of all scientists in 
the crib, and if we did not first of all, in the 
crib, live and experience an imperative to 
grasp the natural and human world, there 
would be no scientists.  
Taking this point about the life of 
understanding back to Weinberg’s initial 
problem, we saw that the question whether a 
claim is a description or an explanation is 
not to be settled by a resistance in the object 
itself, but by a resistance that we introduce 
into our process of comprehension. What 
grounds such resistance points? A claim 
explains if it comprehensively describes 
something that matters to, that has resisted, a 
rational community. This does not mean that 
explanations are “purely subjective” or that 
individual objects explained are 
“constructed.” It just means that objectivity 
itself—what we comprehend by this 
concept—reflects the life of a rational 
community. And this does not mean that 
objectivity is a pure fiction, since life and 
communities themselves have objective 
weight, a resistant flow. The basis of 
rational objectivity is a shared life in a 
shared world, not a criterion given in and of 
itself external to our lives. On Hegel’s 
argument, scientific objectivity cannot be 
established by abstracting from all the 
situatedness and idiosyncrasies of life and 
rising to the point of view of a universal 
reason that would be everywhere the same. 
Rather, it entails a commitment to nurturing 
the interpretative practices of the community 
life that is the resistance point that grounds 
our claims about what really matters.21 And 
if that community were already everywhere 
the same, it would afford no resistance, and 
would afford no possibility of the 
phenomenon that we call science, a 
phenomenon of free and finite individuals 
trying to comprehend the world. 
Hegel’s analysis shows that 
understanding is no mere faculty, but a self-
conscious activity oriented by living 
interests, an activity that surpasses singular 
interests through the life of a community. 
Articulated to its fullest, then, the life of the 
understanding is such that when a scientist 
defends a claim, she not only changes our 
view of the world, she changes the 
community of scientists. But members of 
that community are not scientists merely, 
and are not only scientists. Science affects 
the comprehension and life of a much 
broader community. This applies to the 
child-scientist too, for the child’s growing 
comprehension of the world affects the 
comprehension of those around her. But 
adult science has a much more radical effect, 
for there is a greater freedom in it, and a 
greater responsibility. In our day and age 
science affects just about everybody and just 
about all life. Official science, it seems to 
me, prizes the moment of transforming 
comprehension of the world, of showing 
how the actual is rational, and it urges the 
purity, sovereignty and priority of this 
moment over the moment of transforming 
the community of comprehenders. Hegel’s 
point is that the two cannot be detached, that 
scientific comprehension certifies itself 
through its recognition in what we all know 
and do, that the rational is actual. Reason 
and life cannot be pried apart, so we need a 
science that does not detach itself from life, 
but is committed and responsible to its life 
in the community of reason, that takes 
explanation not as an abstract practice but as 
an ingredient in our desire to comprehend 
our world, a desire that issues into 
14 
dimensions of life that are not merely 
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